Generally, the goal of identification schemes is to provide security assurance against impersonation attacks. Identification schemes based on zero knowledge protocols have more advantages, for example, deniability, which enables the prover to deny an identification proof so that the verifier couldn't persuade others that it is indeed the prover who identified itself to him. This kind of identifications is called 'deniable identification'. However, in some applications we require the existence of a (trusted) party being able to find out an evidence that a party did identify itself to a verifier is required, in order to prevent parties from misbehavior. So in this case 'undeniability' is needed. To the best of our knowledge, an identification scheme that provides both deniability and undeniability does not exist in the literature. In this work we propose the notion of escrowed deniable identification schemes, which integrates both 'escrowed deniability' (undeniability) and 'deniability' properties. Intuitively, in the online communication, a verifier may sometimes need to provide an evidence of a conversation between himself and the prover, for instance, an evidence for the case of misuse of the prover's privilege. We then provide an escrowed deniable identification scheme, and prove its security, i.e. impersonation, deniability and escrowed deniability, in the standard model based on some standard number theoretic assumptions.
Introduction
Since the seminal introduction of zero-knowledge proof by Goldwasser, Micali and Rackoff many interactive identification schemes based on zero-knowledge proofs have been proposed. An interactive identification scheme is a protocol involving two parties, a prover named Peggy, and a verifier named Victor. An identification scheme is to provide an assurance for the verifier that the identity of the prover is indeed as declared. Imagine that Peggy tries to convince Victor of her identity in an online communication. In order to convince Victor, Peggy first provides a public information, which is publicly accessible to every one, and it is associated to her corresponding secret information. By using this secret information, Peggy communicates interactively with Victor, and proves that she is the one who possesses such a secret information corresponding to the public information. Generally, the public information is an instance of a hard problem, which cannot be solved by efficient algorithms, and the secret information is a solution to this instance.
The security of an identification scheme indicates that no efficient adversary can succeed in impersonating Peggy to Victor (with non-negligible probability), however, in most of the schemes in the literature an identification transcript does reveal the identity of the prover to everyone. That is, Victor can convince anyone that Peggy did identify herself to him. In the following, we borrow the politician example given in [24] and extend it. Politicians would like to enter a building equipped with a smart card identification system. A politician acts as a prover and the smart card reader acts as a verifier. In order to prevent the identities of politicians who entered the building from being revealed to paparazzi by the smart card verification system, deniable identification is needed in this case. Now imagine that at sometime, an emergency occurred in the building, and the administrator of it needs to find out who entered this building at certain time interval. If we still use deniable identification, an identification transcript does not necessarily mean that a politician did enter the building at that time interval. Hence, a new variant of identification schemes that we call 'escrowed deniable identification' is required. In this primitive, there is a (trusted) party who is able to produce an evidence to prove that a prover has participated in the generation of the identification transcript, and furthermore, the verifier cannot do so without the help of the trusted party.
Related work
From the inspiration of the identification scheme given by Fiat and Shamir [11] , some other important identification schemes such as [22, 17, 18, 12, 10] have been proposed. Feige, Fiat, and Shamir proposed an identification scheme in 1988, which is based on the difficulty of inverting RSA, which is a well known cryptographic primitive. Later, another identification scheme based on RSA was proposed by Guillou and Quisquarter [12] . In 1989, based on discrete logarithm problem, the state of art of identification scheme was introduced by Schnorr [22] .
In the early 21th century, Bellare and Palacio [4] analyzed Guillou-Quisquarter scheme and Schnorr scheme, and showed that the security against passive attacks of the two schemes can be reduced to standard computational problems such as factoring or discrete logarithms and, their security against active and concurrent attacks can be proven under one-more RSA assumption and one-more discrete logarithm assumption.
After the introduction of bilinear pairing to cryptography, many new problems such as Gap Diffie-Hellman problem, Bilinear Diffie-Hellman problem and etc. have been studied. Many new identification schemes based on these new problems have been proposed in the literature. For example, the first identification based on bilinear Diffie-Hellman problem was given by Kim and Kim [15] . However, their scheme was later broken and improved by Yao, Wang and Wang [25] .
For the security definition, Shoup first formalized the definition of impersonation of identification schemes for passive and active attacks [23] . Later, Bellare and Palacio in [4] analyzed the passive and active attacks and formalized the definition of concurrent attacks for identification schemes. However, none of these known schemes considers the notion of deniability.
The concept of deniability in authentication was first introduced by Dwork, Naor and Sahai [9] . Later, the deniable zero knowledge was formalized by Pass [19] . Following the above works on deniability, some works in other areas such as authentication and key exchange ( [21, 20] ) were proposed.
In 2008, Huang et al. [13] proposed a technique that transforms a weakly unforgeability secured signature scheme into a fully unforgeability secured signature scheme in the standard model. A strong one-time signature is used to sign on a message concatenated with a regular signature signed on a one-time public key. Such a transformation provides a security in the standard model if a signature scheme is the weakly unforgeability secured in the standard model (in other words, the signature is fully unforgeability secured in the random oracle model). We incorporate this technique to construct our EDID scheme in the standard model. In EUROCRYPT 1998, Asokan, Shoup and Waidner [2] proposed a publicly verifiable encryption (fair exchange) protocol. The encrypted signatures are fairly exchange and verifiable that they have been encrypted with the trusted third party's public key and the (encrypted) signatures is valid before each party reveals their decrypted signature in the last round. If one of parties is dishonest, then the other party can request the trusted third party to reveal the signature. We apply this concept in our EDID scheme to achieve the deniable and openable proof of the transcript.
Our Contributions
To the best of our knowledge, there is no identification which integrates both the deniability and undeniability. In this work we first propose the notion of 'escrowed deniable identification schemes', which protects the identity of the prover from being revealed to the public by the verifier, and in the meanwhile, endows a (trusted) party with the ability to reveal the prover's identity from an identification transcript non-interactively, thus restricting provers from misbehavior. We then provide formal security definitions for escrowed deniable identification schemes, which includes impersonation, deniability, and transferability/escrowed deniability. Finally, we propose a concrete and efficient construction of escrowed deniable identification scheme, and prove its security in the standard model based on some standard number-theoretic assumptions.
We note that there are several works studying the 'escrow' property in other areas, such as verifiable escrowed signatures by Mao [16] , 'escrowed linkability of ring signatures' by Chow, Susilo and Yuen [8] , and etc. These works are closely related to our work in the definition of 'escrow', however, it is not trivial and easy to transform these works to obtain an escrowed deniable identification scheme. We also note that our new primitive shares some commonalities with the recent notion of 'ambiguous fair exchange' due to Huang et al. [14] . Nonetheless, our primitive requires the transferability property which allows the verifier can prove to others without revealing the prover's signature that the prover ever identified himself (c.f. [14] ). Although the construction in [14] can be extended to provide this extra property, we take a different approach to achieve a more efficient scheme in our concrete scheme.
Paper Organization
In the next section we review some number-theoretic assumptions which will be used in our construction. We provide the definition of escrowed deniable identification scheme in Sec. 3. The formal models of security properties of an escrowed deniable identification scheme are also given here. In Sec. 4 we propose our efficient construction of escrowed deniable identification scheme. Its security is analyzed in Sec. 5. Section 6 is the conclusion of the paper. ← . In an identification scheme we denote by ( ) an honest prover (verifier), and by * ( * ) a malicious prover (verifier) which may deviate from the protocol in an arbitrary way. We also denote by ⟨ (.), (.)⟩(.) an execution of an interactive protocol between two PPT algorithms and , i.e., ⟨ ( ), ⟩( ) is an execution of the identification scheme between the prover with a secret key and the verifier on common input . We denote by (.) an algorithm which has oracle access to another function .
Basic Concepts on Bilinear Pairings and Complexity Assumptions
Let 1 and 2 be cyclic multiplicative groups generated by 1 and 2 respectively. The order of both generators is a prime . Let be a cyclic multiplicative group with the same order . We say thatˆ : 1 × 2 → is an admissible bilinear pairing if the followings hold: ) where ∈ ℤ * . An algorithm is said to ( , ) solves the -SDH problem in ( 1 , 2 ) if runs in time , and
where the probability is taken over the random choices of , ∈ ℤ * and the random bits consumed by .
Assumption 1. ( -Strong Diffie-Hellman Assumption [6])
We say that the ( , , )-SDH (or -SDH, for simplicity) assumption in ( 1 , 2 ) holds if there is no PPT algorithm that ( , ) solves the -SDH problem.
For simplicity, we assume that 1 = 2 , and let 1 , be two cyclic (multiplicative) groups of prime order with an admissible bilinear pairingˆ : 1 × 1 → . Let be a generator of
Definition 2 (Decision Linear Diffie-Hellman (DLDH) Problem). Given a random 6-tuple ( , , , , , ℎ) ∈ 1 as input, decide whether or not ℎ = + . An algorithm is said to ( , ) solves the DLDH problem in 1 , if runs in time , and 
where the probability is taken over the random choice of ∈ ℤ and the random bits consumed by .
Assumption 3. ( -Discrete Logarithm ( -DL) Assumption)
We say that the ( , , )-DL (or -DL, for simplicity) assumption in 1 holds if there is no PPT algorithm that ( , ) solves the -DL problem.
Boneh-Boyen Short Signature Without Random Oracles
In this section, we briefly describe the Boneh-Boyen signature scheme (or 04 signature, in short) [6] which we will incorporate to construct our escrowed deniable identification in the standard model. The 04 signature scheme described as follows:
Key Generation (KeyGen): KeyGen randomly selects ∈ 1 ; ∈ 2 ; , ∈ ℤ and computes
The public key is = ( 1 , 2 , , , ) and the secret key is = ( , ). Signing (Sign): Given a secret key , a public key and a message ∈ ℤ , Sign randomly selects ∈ and computes ← 1/( + ⋅ + ) 1 . The signature on message is ( , ) Verification (Verf): Given a signature, a public key and a message ∈ ℤ , Verf checks whetherˆ ( , ⋅ ⋅ 2 ) = . If it holds then Accept, otherwise Reject.
, then the 04 signature scheme is ( , , )-secure against strong existential forgery under an adaptive chosen message attack where T is the maximum time for an exponentiation in 1 
Note that, for simplicity, we define 1 = 2 in our scheme and we denote the 04 short signature as the weakly secure short signature. The 04 short signature is different from the 04 signature by removing , from the public key and secret key, and computing a signature as ← 1/( + ) 1 .
Escrowed Deniable Identification
In this section, we provide a formal model of an escrowed deniable identification scheme and its security model. Different from previous definitions of identification schemes [4, 18, 22, 23, 1, 3] , we introduce a trusted third party into escrowed deniable identification, who has the power of invoking the deniability of the prover. Therefore, in the security models of escrowed deniable identification schemes, we consider a new property, 'transferability'. It provides security guarantee for the trusted third party and the prover, which preserves the privacy for all other cases except the case in dispute.
Escrowed Deniable Identification Schemes
We introduce a notion called escrowed deniable identification scheme (EDID) that balances both the need for deniability and the need for undeniability in identification schemes. In an escrowed deniable identification scheme, in addition to that the prover can deny an identification transcript, a trusted authority can convert a deniable identification transcript into an undeniable one, enabling anyone to verify ownership of the transcript.
Formally, an EDID scheme involves a prover , a verifier , a trusted authority , and any third party ′ . It consists of the following algorithms and protocols:
Setup: On input 1 , where is the security parameter, the algorithm generates a system parameter, i.e. param ← Setup(1 ). KeyGen : On input param, it generates a public/secret key pair ( , ) for the trusted author-
This is an interactive protocol between the prover and the verifier . It consists of four rounds of communication and six PPT algorithms, (Cmt , Cmt , Ch, Rsp, Check , Check ), where (Cmt , Check ) and (Check , Cmt ) are sets of algorithms to generate commitments and to verify the commitment run by the prover and the verifier , respectively, Ch is an algorithm to disclose the challenge, and Rsp is an algorithm run by the prover to generate the response after the process of commitment generation, challenge disclosure and commitment verification.
chooses a challenge at random from a certain domain, and computes ← Cmt ( ). then sends to . -Step 2. chooses at random from a certain domain, and computes ← Cmt ( ). then sends to . -Step 3. runs Ch to reveal a random challenge , and sends it to . -Step 4. After receiving 's challenge , then runs ← ( , ). If = 0, aborts; otherwise, it computes its response by running ← Rsp( , , ), and sends to . -Step 5. checks the validity of 's response by running Check ( , , , , ). If the output is '1', accepts; otherwise, it rejects.
Open protocol ( , ): An open protocol can be formalized by two (probabilistic) polynomialtime algorithms Open, Verf, where Open is invoked by , and Verf is executed by the verifier . On input a transcript and the secret key of , Open outputs an evidence to affirm the authenticity of . Verf is an algorithm for validating the validity of the evidence with respect to and . It takes as input , , and the evidence, and outputs 1 for accepting or 0 for rejecting the evidence. Transfer protocol ( , ′ ): A transfer protocol is an interactive protocol between the verifier , who possesses a transcript and its affirmative evidence from the trusted authority ( ), and any third party ′ . The aim of the protocol is to convince ′ that indeed represents an execution of the identification protocol between and .
The completeness can be defined in a natural way. Next we define other security properties for an escrowed deniable identification scheme.
Deniability
Roughly speaking, deniability indicates that given a transcript of an execution of the identification protocol, the prover is able to deny that he is the prover in the execution. To achieve the deniability, we require that the verifier itself could generate this transcript. Formally, we consider the following definition, which share a similarity with that of zero knowledge.
Definition 4 (Deniability). An escrowed deniable identification scheme EDID is deniable if for any ← Setup(1 ), ( , ) ← KeyGen (param) and ( , ) ← KeyGen (param), for any PPT algorithm , for any verifier strategy * , there exists a PPT algorithm which has oracle access to * , such that
where (⋅) is a negligible function in , and Expt 1 ( ) and Expt 2 ( ) are defined as follows:
where the probabilities are taken over the random bits used in Setup, KeyGen , KeyGen , and random bits consumed by , * , and .
Impersonation
An identification scheme is secure against the impersonation meant that no one except the prover with its public key can identify itself to others as . In this work we consider the most common impersonation attacks, i.e. passive attacks and active attacks, which are described as below:
-Passive Attack (imp-pa): This is the weakest form of attacks considered for impersonation.
An adversary can only listen to the interaction between a prover and a verifier, and then begin to impersonate the prover after the interaction. -Active Attack (imp-aa): This attack is stronger than the one above. In an active attack, the adversary, acting as a (cheating) verifier, actively interacts with prover clones in sequence.
After the last execution of the identification protocol is over, it starts to impersonate the prover to others.
(Impersonation under Active Attack): An imp-aa adversary is a pair of PPT algorithms ( 1 , 2 ), where 1 acts as * and 2 acts as * . Let denote the state of information. The active attack is initialized by first calling Setup, KeyGen and KeyGen to generate public/secret key pairs ( , ) and ( , ) for the trusted authority and the prover respectively. Taking public keys and as input, the adversary then performs its attack in the following two phases:
-Phase 1. (Learning Phase) Given input , , the adversary 1 is allowed to interact with 's clones sequentially. When each of 's clones interacts with 1 , it is initialized with ( , ), and fresh random coins. Later, 1 outputs to be passed onto 2 . This completes phase 1.
-Phase 2. (Impersonation Phase) At the beginning of phase 2, is initialized with the public keys , , while the adversary 2 is given . Then 2 tries to impersonate to . At the end of this phase, outputs a decision bit , indicating accept or reject.
The adversary is said to be successful in the attack if outputs 1 at the end of Phase 2. Formally, we consider the following experiment:
where an oracle call to ( ) results in an execution of the identification protocol with the prover and a transcript is returned.
Definition 5 (Security against Impersonation under Active Attack). We say an escrowed deniable identification scheme EDID is secure against impersonation under active attack, if there is no PPT adversary = ( 1 , 2 ) such that the probability Pr[Expt imp−aa ( ) = 1] is negligible in .
Note that in the definition above the adversary can be the trusted authority. That is, even TA cannot impersonate the prover in an active attack.
Transferability
Intuitively, the notion of transferability in escrowed deniability identification schemes is aimed to reveal the transcript confirmation or evidence that proves the validity of the prover of the transcript. The idea is that a verifier is provided with evidence for a case in dispute to prove to another party who would like to be convinced of the validity of the transcript. To complete this idea, a trusted authority is involved to process an opening (transferring) algorithm. Unlike the deniability property in a general identification scheme (ie., zero-knowledge protocol based identification schemes), the verifier can now convince another party that the transcript of an identification scheme is actually due to an interaction with the claimed prover with the help of or evidence from a trusted party.
In the experiment below, the adversary is modeled as a malicious verifier who tries to convince any third party to accept the transcript without the help of the trusted authority. Hence, the trusted authority is viewed as an opening oracle who answers queries for opening the chosen transcript. We provide a formal definition of transferability as follows:
Let * be any verifier strategy (honest or malicious). Let ( , ) be the prover's public key and private key generated by the key generation algorithm of the identification scheme, and let ( , ) be the 's public key and private key, respectively, generated by the key generation algorithm of the identification scheme. Let ← ⟨ ( ), * ⟩( ) be the transcript of an interaction between and * , and let ← ⟨ ( ), * ⟩( ) be the confirmation evidence of an interaction between and * . Let Verf be the verifier's decision algorithm which takes a transcript and its confirmation evidence as inputs and outputs 1 or 0, which indicate 'accept' or 'reject', respectively. Let be a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm. We consider the following experiment:
Adversary is said to be successful in the attack if outputs = accept.
Definition 6 (Security against Transferability Attack
). An identification scheme ID = (KeyGen, , ) is said to be secure against transferability attack if there is no probabilistic polynomial-time tran adversary = ( 1 , 2 ) such that the probability Pr[Expt tran ( ) = 1] is negligible in . 
High Level Idea
Before presenting our construction of escrowed deniable identification schemes, we will first describe our idea and intuition behind our construction. Let TA's pair of public/secret keys be ( , ). Firstly, generates a commitment Cmt, and replies with a random challenge . Then, signs both Cmt and to obtain . Next, will verifiably encrypt using the TA's public key . That is,ˆ ← ( ). Then, sendsˆ to . can check the validity ofˆ with respect to and , but cannot transfer this conviction to anyone else (due to the indistinguishability property of the verifiable encryption used). When mischievous behavior occurs, TA converts the transcript and makes it undeniable. TA can decryptˆ using to obtain , and since is a regular digital signature generated by , it is undeniable.
The Construction
In this section, we present our scheme based on the idea outlined above. The construction uses a Boneh-Boyen short signature scheme and verifiable encryption scheme due to Boneh et al. [6, 7] . We incorporate the technique in [13] to construct our EDID scheme in the standard model. The scheme works as follows. is a bilinear pairing. Let : {0, 1} * → ℤ * be a collision-resistant hash function. The system parameter param then consists of ( 1 , ,ˆ , , , 1 , 2 , ). 2. KeyGen : Given the public parameter param, KeyGen Select random numbers , ∈ ℤ ; ∈ 1 and compute = , = . The public key and private key of the trusted authority are = ( , , ) and = ( , ) respectively. 3. KeyGen : Given the public parameter param, KeyGen selects a random number ∈ ℤ and compute = 1 . The public key and private key of the prover are = and = respectively. 4. Identification protocol: The protocol comprises two parts. The first part is a 4-round zeroknowledge proof protocol of the Schnorr Identification, in which the prover proves to the verifier that he knows the secret key which is the discrete logarithm of the public key to base 1 . In the second part of the identification protocol, prover generates a 04 short signature on the 4-round Schnorr Identification transcript he just carried out with the verifier. then computesˆ , which is the verifiable encryption of under the TA's public key, and sends it to the verifier. Finally, proves, in an interactive manner, to the verifier thatˆ is correctly formed. Following the description above, the protocol will be more than four rounds. Optimization of the round efficiency of the protocol can be done by setting to be the signature on the first two rounds of the 4-round Schnorr Identification protocol and conducting the proof-of-correctness ofˆ in parallel with the Schnorr Identification with the verifier. The resulting protocol remains four rounds and it is shown as follows. iii. Let = ( ). Now, computes a signature = 1 + . Then, computes 3 = + and 3 =ˆ ( , 
Output reject otherwise. 5. Open protocol: A protocol can be denoted by = ( Open, Verf), where Open and Verf are PPT algorithms used in the protocol detailed in Figure 2 . 6. Transfer protocol: A protocol can be denoted by = ( Cmt, Ch, Rsp, Check ), where Cmt, Ch, Rsp and Check are PPT algorithms used in the following protocol, where the verifier proves that a transcript denoted as is indeed generated by to any third party verifier. This protocol is illustrated in Figure 2 .
Security Analysis
In this section, we provide security proofs for our proposed EDID schemes, which include deniability, security against impersonation and transferability (escrowed deniability). For a brief representation, we first define the following notations, which we will use throughout the rest of this section.
Deniability
We provide the proof that the identification protocol and the transfer protocol in our EDID scheme are zero knowledge protocol. First, the completeness of the identification protocol and the transfer protocol in EDID scheme are straight forward, hence, it will be omitted. Secondly, the zero knowledge proof of the identification protocol and the transfer protocol in EDID scheme are stated as the following theorems.
Theorem 2. The identification protocol in our identification scheme EDID is deniable.
Proof. Let be a simulator and * be any verifier. Given the public keys = ( , , ), and = = 1 , algorithm simulates transcripts as follows:
1. First, receives from * , and then computes its response as follows:
. 2. After * replies with ′ and ′ , checks the validity of ( ′ , ′ ) with respect to and then rewinds * to previous state and computes a new response as follows: -Run KeyGen of 04 signature scheme and obtain = ( , , = , = , = ( , )) and = ( , ).
-Select , , , , ,
Any third party
, then the transcript was generated by 
,¯ , ,ˆ ,ˆ ) to * . 3. Finally, upon the receiving of and from * , aborts if ∕ = ′ or ∕ = ′ . Otherwise, replies with ( , , ).
From the structure of protocol and the simulation process, the difference between the distributions of the real transcripts = { } and the simulated transcriptsˆ = {ˆ } only lies in the event that the ∕ = ′ or ∕ = ′ . We denote by INEQ this event. We can see that the probability that event INEQ happens only with negligible probability. If this is not the case, we can compute the discrete logarithm of 2 with respect to the base 1 . If ∕ = ′ , it turns out that ∕ = ′ as well. Since
. As the group order is known, we can get that log 1 2 = ( − ′ )/( ′ − ) mod . This contradicts the discrete logarithm assumption and hence, we can run this experiment to solve the discrete logarithm problem by setting 1 = ℎ and 2 = ℎ , where ℎ, ℎ are instances of the discrete logarithm problem. Therefore, we conclude that for any PPT algorithm ,
which is also negligible in . ⊓ ⊔ Theorem 3. The transfer protocol in our identification scheme EDID = (Setup, KeyGen, , , , ) is zero knowledge protocol.
Proof. Let be a simulator and plays a role of any arbitrary verifier * . Let be a transcript that want to prove a procession of a proof of transcript , which is a signature . simulates transcripts as follows:
1. First, receives from . Upon the access to the random tape used by * , obtain ′ and ′ , where
Then, computes a response as follows:
3. Upon the receiving of and , aborts if ∕ = ′ or ∕ = ′ . Otherwise, replies with .
Let be a transcript of the real transfer transcripts andˆ be a transcript of the simulated transfer transcripts. From the structure of protocol and the simulation process, the difference between the distributions of the real transcripts = { } and the simulated transcriptsˆ = {ˆ } only happen when the ∕ = ′ or ∕ = ′ in the reveal of challenge step. Since both , $ ← ℤ , the probability that ∕ = ′ or ∕ = ′ but = ′ 1 ′ 2 = 1 2 is equal to 1/ . Therefore, the distance between the probability distribution of andˆ caused by this reason is no more than 1/2 where is a security parameter and ≈ | |. Therefore, the distance between the probability distribution of andˆ is
which is negligible for sufficiently large . ⊓ ⊔
Security Analysis for Impersonation
The following is the security analysis of our escrowed deniability identification scheme against impersonation under active attacks. Before this, we recall that a confirmation evidence generated in the 2 round of the protocol is indeed a Boneh-Boyen basic short signature.
Theorem 4. Our identification scheme EDID is secure against impersonation under active attacks in the standard model, if the -DL assumption holds.
Proof. Suppose that there exists a PPT imp-aa adversary = ( 1 , 2 ) for EDID scheme such that the probability Pr[Expt imp−aa ( ) = 1] is non-negligible. Then we show that there exists a PPT adversary ℱ for solving the -DL problem using as a subroutine. ℱ is given , , 2 , ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ , ∈ 1 as input. ℱ computes 1 and in the same way with the proof of Lemma 1 in [6] . ℱ then sets = 1 and 2 = , where ,
, } be the list of pre-computed one-time public keys and secret keys. Let
, )} be the list of hash value of the one time public keys. Identification queries : On input a call, ℱ simulates the prover as follows:
with respect to the proof of Lemma 1 in [6] . Then compute ′ 3 = + . Obtain ∈ , where = ( ) and then select ′ $ ← ℤ * and compute¯ ′ = (T, , Otherwise, it rewinds 1 to the second step and then computes as follows: (a) , , , ,
replies with ′ , ′ . 6. Check the validation of ′ , ′ with and check whether = ′ and = ′ . If the above does not hold, ℱ aborts the current execution. Otherwise, it returnsˆ = ( , , ) to . 7. Finally, ℱ records a transcript and a signature . Now, ℱ runs the eimp-aa experiment with . First, in the Learning Phase, the entire parameter is first initialized. The public/secret key pair of provers is initially set to = and = , Then the public/secret key pair is generated by running ( , ) ← KeyGen(1 ). In this phase, plays a role of 1 . 1 is given with , , and the access to . At the end of this phase, 1 outputs a state of information and passes it to 2 . Now we move to the Impersonation Phase. On input from the Learning Phase, 2 runs the identification protocol to convince (played by ℱ) to accept 2 as . Note that the public parameter for 2 can be obtained from 1 in the previous phase. 2 then interacts with ℱ as the following protocol:
-(ℱ → 2 ) Select random integers , ∈ ℤ * and compute = 1 2 . ℱ sends to 2 .
wins the game if a transcript = ( , T, ,¯ , , 1 , 2 , 3 , 1 , 2 , 3 , , ,ˆ ) from above protocol passes the validation. Due to the fact that ℱ possessed , , which are secret keys to solve the relationship among , 1 and 2 , with a overwhelming probability, ℱ then rewinds 2 to the third step and replies 2 with ′ , ′ ∈ ℤ * such that ′ ∕ = and ′ ∕ = . 2 responds witĥ ′ = ( ′ , ′ , ′ ) and let 2 = ( , T, ,¯ , , 1 , 2 , 3 , 1 , 2 , 3 , ′ , ′ ,ˆ ′ ) denote the second transcript. From these two transcripts, ℱ compute as the answer to -DL problem.
Next, we conclude the success probability that successes the impersonation. There are two events that trigger ℱ to abort. We will show that ℱ will abort the simulation with negligible probability. These two events are in the steps 4 and 6 of the identification queries. The first event is that
. If this event occurs, then 1 can be used to solve the discrete logarithm problem where, on input , , find . We simply set 1 = ; 2 = then, upon receiving , , ′ and ′ , we compute = ( − ′ )/( ′ − ). Hence, this event occurs with negligible probability underlying that the discrete logarithm problem is hard. The last event is when , is dishonestly generated and is consequently not valid. Since the correctness of = 1 2 holds with negligible probability of error with regard to the first event, we can conclude that if 1 is correctly interacting with the identification queries, then the second event will not occur. Therefore, we claim that ℱ solves the -DL problem with non-negligible probability by using .
To conclude, the above shows that if there exists an adversary that breaks the impersonation of an EDID scheme under active attack, then we can use this adversary to solve the -DL problem with non-negligible probability. Conversely, if the -DL problem holds, then the EDID scheme is secure against impersonation under active attack. ⊓ ⊔
Security Analysis for Transferability
Theorem 5. Our identification scheme EDID = (Setup, KeyGen, , , , ) is secure against transferability attack if only the -SDH problem hold under in the standard model.
Proof. From the proof in Theorem 2 and Theorem 3, the identification protocol and the transfer protocol in our EDID scheme (computational) are zero knowledge protocol. Based on the above statement, we can exclude a PPT tran adversary that can distinguish the simulated transcripts out of the actual transcripts. We also exclude an adversary that, without help from the trusted third party, uses any mean (or any protocol) to convince another party that the adversary has actually interacted with the prover to generate a transcript. If there exists an adversary as described above then that adversary in fact seems to be an adversary against deniability where the proof has been provided in a proof of Theorem 2. Hence, the rest of the proof will show that, assumed that there exists a PPT tran adversary = ( 1 , 2 ), there exists a PPT algorithm ℱ using to solve the -SDH problem. Start with ℱ constructing queries and setting up public parameters as follow:
Parameter setup: First, ℱ is given , , 2 , ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ , ∈ 1 as input. Then, ℱ computes 1 and in the same way with the proof of Lemma 1 in [6] . ℱ then sets = 1 and 2 = , where , $ ← ℤ . Next, ℱ runs KeyGen to get the public key and private key of the trusted authority, which are = ( , , ) and
, −1 , * , * } be the list of pre-compute one-time public keys and secret keys. Let wins the game if a transfer transcript = ( , , 1 , 2 , , , ) from above protocol passes the validation. Due to the fact that ℱ possessed , , which are secret keys to solve the relationship among , 1 and 2 , with a overwhelming probability, ℱ then rewinds 2 to the third step and replies 2 with ′ , ′ ∈ ℤ * such that ′ ∕ = and ′ ∕ = . Then 2 responds with ′ and let ′ = ( , , 1 , 2 , ′ , ′ , ′ ) denote the second transfer transcript. Let , be a number of queries that makes to identification queries and open queries, respectively. Within the probability 1 , processes the second phase with * . If wins the game with * , then, from the above two transcripts, ℱ computes a signature * on message * as the answer to -SDH problem.
There are certain events that cause ℱ to abort the simulation. We will show that such events happen with negligible probability or that some are expected to occur with non-negligible probability. First, in the open queries, the first event( 1 ) is that ℱ aborts the simulation when = * . This event is already expected to happen within the probability (1−1/( )) ≥ 1/ where is the natural logarithm. The other event( 2 ) is also in the open queries when is not in the list of transcript produced by but it passes the verification. This means that can produce a valid transcript. Then can indeed be used to break the impersonation of our EDID scheme. Hence, from the proof in Theorem 4, the probability that ℱ aborts in this event is negligible. For the events above, the probability that ℱ does not abort the simulation is non-negligible, where Pr[ 1 ] + Pr[ 2 ] ≈ 1/ . Hence, we claim that the probability that wins the game is non-negligible if the probability of solving the -SDH problem is non-negligible.
